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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
This case requires us to decide, as a matter of first 
impression, whether a transfer of real estate title conducted 
via New Jersey’s tax foreclosure procedures may be voided as 
“preferential” under § 547(b) of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code.1  Appellant Arianna Holding Company LLC purchased 
a tax lien on a piece of property owned by Frank J. Hackler 
and Dawn Stelzle-Hackler.  Arianna eventually obtained title 
to the Hacklers’ property via foreclosure proceedings.  
Shortly after Arianna obtained title, the Hacklers filed for 
bankruptcy and sought to void the transfer of the title as 
preferential.  The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court 
ruled in favor of the Hacklers and voided the title transfer.  
Because the title transfer undisputedly meets § 547(b)’s 
requirements for avoidance and because the federalism 
concerns raised by Arianna cannot overcome the plain 
language of the Bankruptcy Code, we will affirm. 
 
I  
The Hacklers failed to pay property tax on a parcel in 
North Brunswick, New Jersey.  On June 25, 2013, the 
township held a duly advertised tax sale—a public auction for 
the unpaid municipal lien on the property.  While mortgage 
foreclosures involve bidding on the actual property, at New 
Jersey tax foreclosures the public bids only on the rate of 
interest on the unpaid taxes; the lowest bidder wins.2  
Accordingly, the redemption amount for a tax lien 
                                              
1 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). 
2 N.J.S.A. 54:5-32. 
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certificate—the amount the property owner must pay to 
recover the lien and prevent foreclosure—is calculated from 
the accrued taxes plus interest, not from the value of the 
underlying property.3  At the tax sale for the lien on the 
Hacklers’ property, Phoenix Funding, Inc., bid the interest 
rate on the tax sale certificate down to 0% and paid a 
premium of $13,500 above the value of the lien.  Phoenix 
paid the delinquent taxes as they became due and charged the 
state-allowed interest rate of 18% on the subsequent taxes.4   
 
In New Jersey, tax sale foreclosures are “strict 
foreclosures.”5  If the property owner does not redeem the 
certificate by paying the lienholder the redemption amount 
(the original unpaid taxes and subsequent taxes plus 18%), 
the certificate holder may, after two years, file for a 
foreclosure judgment; that judgment vests title directly in the 
tax lien certificate holder.  After waiting the required two-
year period, and after sending a notice of intent to foreclose, 
Phoenix filed an uncontested tax foreclosure complaint.  On 
May 9, 2016, Phoenix assigned the certificate to Arianna 
Holding Company, LLC, a real estate holding company.  The 
Hacklers did not redeem the tax lien certificate, and on 
October 6, 2016, final judgment in the foreclosure was 
entered, vesting title to the Property in Arianna (the Transfer).   
                                              
3 N.J.S.A. 54:5-58; see also In re Hackler, 588 B.R. 394, 399 
(D.N.J. 2018) (citing In re Berley Assocs., Ltd., 492 B.R. 433, 
439-40 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013)).  
4 N.J.S.A. 54:4-67; see also In re Hackler, 571 B.R. 662, 663 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2017). 
5 N.J.S.A. 54:5-86; see also Caput Mortuum, L.L.C. v. S&S 
Crown Servs., 841 A.2d 430, 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2004).  
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On December 14, 2016, a little over two months after 
the Transfer, the Hacklers filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy 
petition.  The petition and schedules listed the value of the 
property at $335,000, which far exceeded the value of the 
liens against the property (Arianna filed a proof of claim for 
$42,561.21, and other liens totaled no more than $89,000).  
The Hacklers’ Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay Arianna’s 
claim in full.   
 
The same day that they filed for bankruptcy, the 
Hacklers opened an adversary proceeding seeking to avoid 
the Transfer of the Property to Arianna as a preferential 
transfer under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and moved 
for summary judgment.  Arianna cross-moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that voiding the Transfer would represent 
an impermissible incursion into the state’s essential interests 
in preserving the validity of real estate title and collecting real 
estate taxes.   
   
The Bankruptcy Court ruled for the Hacklers, voiding 
the Transfer and directing that title to the Property return to 
them.  The Bankruptcy Court found that the Transfer met all 
the requirements of § 547(b) and held that Arianna’s 
federalism concerns could not overcome the Code’s clear 
statutory text.  The District Court affirmed, and Arianna now 
appeals. 
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II6 
A 
It is well-established that a “‘central policy’ of the 
Bankruptcy Code is the ‘[e]quality of distribution among 
creditors.’”7  In accordance with that policy, creditors of 
equal priority receive pro rata shares of the debtor’s property.  
A critical feature of this system is the ability to avoid pre-
petition property transfers that benefit some creditors over 
others.8  The Code does so by allowing the unwinding of 
property transfers that meet certain requirements, thereby 
preventing some creditors from receiving windfalls at the 
expense of others.  As is relevant to the instant petition, a 
property transfer may be voided as preferential under § 547 or 
as fraudulent under § 548.  While both § 548 and § 547 
permit the unwinding of certain property transfers, they serve 
                                              
6 The Bankruptcy Court exercised jurisdiction over the matter 
as a “core proceeding” under bankruptcy law.  28 U.S.C. §§ 
157(a); 157(b)(2)(F); 1334(a).  The District Court exercised 
jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) and 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In a bankruptcy appeal, we exercise 
plenary review over the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 866 F.3d 515, 522 (3d 
Cir. 2017).  Arianna does not argue that the Transfer fails to 
meet any of the elements of § 547(b) and so this case presents 
no dispute of fact.     
7 In re Net Pay Solutions, Inc., 822 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quoting Begier v. Comm’r, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)). 
8 Id. (discussing preferential transfers). 
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different purposes, use different statutory language, and 
require different analyses.   
 
This case involves a preferential transfer under § 
547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Under that provision, which 
prevents creditors from rushing to take assets before a debtor 
files for bankruptcy, the trustee may avoid any transfer: 
 
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by 
the debtor before such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
(4) made-- 
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition; or 
(B) between ninety days and one year before the 
date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor 
at the time of such transfer was an insider; and 
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such 
creditor would receive if-- 
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this 
title; 
(B) the transfer had not been made; and 
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt 
to the extent provided by the provisions of this 
title.9 
 
The Bankruptcy Court and the District Court found 
that the Transfer was voidable as preferential.  Thus, they did 
                                              
9 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).   
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not reach the question whether the Transfer was alternatively 
voidable as fraudulent under § 548.10     
 
B 
Our analysis begins with the statutory text.11  The 
parties do not dispute the meaning of § 547(b).  As explained 
above, a transfer may be voided as preferential if it (1) was 
made to or for the benefit of a creditor, (2) was made for an 
antecedent debt, (3) was made while the debtor was insolvent, 
(4) was made on or within 90 days before filing for 
bankruptcy, and (5) enabled the creditor to receive more than 
it would have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.   
 
Nor do the parties dispute the applicability of § 547(b) 
to the Transfer in this case.  The Transfer was made to the tax 
certificate holder, for a debt that arose before the Hacklers 
                                              
10 Under § 548, which prevents actual and constructive fraud, 
see BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 535 
(1994) a transfer made within two years of filing for 
bankruptcy may be voided if the debtor (1) had “actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which 
the debtor” was indebted, or (2) “received less than a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such 
transfer” and either was insolvent, expected to become 
insolvent, or was trying to benefit an “insider.”  11 
U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).  The term “insider” is defined at 11 
U.S.C. § 101. 
11 In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“It is the cardinal canon of statutory 
interpretation that a court must begin with the statutory 
language . . . .”).   
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petitioned for bankruptcy, while the Hacklers were 
insolvent,12 and within 90 days of their petition; it bestowed a 
parcel worth $335,000 on a party that would have received 
$45,000 in a Chapter 7 proceeding.  “[W]hen the statute’s 
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least 
where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to 
enforce it according to its terms.”13  Unless there is 
ambiguity, we “cannot allow policy to guide our analysis.”14  
Here, the statute is unambiguous.  Applying its 
straightforward terms does not lead us to an absurd result.  
Thus, our reading of it ends there.15 
 
In requesting that we look beyond the plain terms of 
the statute, Arianna raises two separate arguments, both 
sounding in principles of federalism.  First, the company 
argues that a lawfully-conducted state tax foreclosure cannot 
constitute a voidable preference under § 547.  Arianna relies 
in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in BFP v. Resolution 
                                              
12 For the purposes of § 547, “the debtor is presumed to have 
been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately 
preceding the date of the filing of the petition.”  11 U.S.C. § 
547(f).   
13 Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 
N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).   
14 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Barry, 41 F.3d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 
1994).  
15 In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d at 304 
(“When the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . judicial 
inquiry is complete.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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Trust Corp.,16 which interpreted § 548 of the Bankruptcy 
Code and which, it claims, should also apply so that New 
Jersey tax sale foreclosures are exempted from avoidance 
under § 547.  Second, Arianna argues that the avoidance of 
the Transfer violated the Tax Injunction Act.17  As discussed 
below, we find the statute to be clear and its required outcome 
not absurd.  But even giving full weight to Arianna’s points, 
neither argument compels a different result.  We address each 
in turn.   
i 
Arianna argues first that the tax foreclosure cannot 
constitute a voidable preference under § 547(b).  The 
company relies chiefly on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.  In BFP, the question before 
the Court was “whether the consideration received from a 
noncollusive, real estate mortgage foreclosure sale conducted 
in conformance with applicable state law” satisfied the 
requirement of § 548 that a property transfer be made in 
exchange for “a reasonably equivalent value,” so that the 
transfer was protected from voidance.18  The Court held that 
the amount received at the mortgage foreclosure sale 
constituted “reasonably equivalent value.”  Thus, the sale 
could not be voided under § 548.   
 
BFP differs from the case before us in two crucial 
ways.  First, the Court was interpreting the fraudulent transfer 
provision, § 548, not the preferential transfer provision.  
Second, the decision involved a mortgage foreclosure, not a 
                                              
16 511 U.S. 531 (1994). 
17 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
18 511 U.S. at 533 (quoting § 548(a)(2)).  
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tax foreclosure.  These are not trivial distinctions.  The BFP 
opinion is grounded in the text of § 548, in particular the term 
“reasonably equivalent value,” which is not defined in the 
Code and appears nowhere else.  For the Court, the fact that 
Congress “[went] out of its way to” replace the usual term 
“fair market value” with this “entirely novel” term indicated 
that “fair market value cannot—or at least cannot always—be 
the benchmark.”19  The Court buttressed its reading by 
considering how mortgage foreclosures work, and in 
particular, “that market value, as it is commonly understood, 
has no applicability in the forced-sale context; indeed, it is the 
very antithesis of forced-sale value.”20  The Court recognized 
that a foreclosed home, sold at auction, cannot be expected to 
bring the price it would command if sold in a fair market after 
negotiation and mutual agreement.  Congress’s use of the 
term “reasonably equivalent value,” therefore, could not have 
been intended to mean market value, and whatever 
consideration was received through the regularly-conducted 
sale was sufficient so that the sale could not be avoided under 
§ 548.   
 
The Court’s decision in BFP is thus closely tied to 
both the language of § 548 and the mechanics of mortgage 
foreclosures.  The Court even emphasized, in a footnote, that 
its “opinion . . . cover[ed] only mortgage foreclosures of real 
estate,” because “[t]he considerations bearing upon other 
foreclosures and forced sales (to satisfy tax liens, for 
example) may be different.”21  This is such a case.  As 
explained above, at New Jersey tax sales the public bids only 
                                              
19 Id. at 537.   
20 Id.   
21 Id. n.3 (emphasis added). 
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on the rate of interest on the unpaid taxes.  The main 
conclusion of BFP—that the price reached via a foreclosure 
conducted according to state law should be considered to be 
the “reasonably equivalent value” of the property—is not 
pertinent here, because in New Jersey, the relationship 
between the winning bid and the value of the underlying 
property is not merely attenuated but nonexistent.  Given that 
the term “reasonably equivalent value” does not appear in § 
547(b), and in light of the divergent procedures and attendant 
considerations in tax foreclosure proceedings in New Jersey, 
we find BFP inapplicable to this case.22 
 
Arianna urges a contrary result, claiming that BFP 
stands for the proposition that, absent a clear and manifest 
intent of Congress to displace an area traditionally regulated 
by the states, the Bankruptcy Code should not be construed to 
supersede state law.  To be sure, the BFP Court carefully 
considered the potential infringement on the state.  Given the 
“essential state interest” in protecting the stability of real 
estate titles, the Court found that without a clear signal from 
Congress, it could not read § 548—the meaning of which was 
disputed—in a way that would cause “[t]he title of every 
piece of realty purchased at foreclosure,” a long-observed 
state remedy, to “be under a federally created cloud.”23  But 
at its core, Arianna’s argument puts the cart before the horse:  
The problem before the Court was how to interpret the term 
“reasonably equivalent value,” a term that does not appear in 
§ 547(b).  The Court did consider the implications to the 
                                              
22 We emphasize that our opinion is limited to New Jersey tax 
foreclosures conducted in accordance with state law.   
23 511 U.S. at 544.   
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state’s interests of voiding a mortgage foreclosure, but the 
case hinged on the meaning of the statute.   
 
Our conclusion that BFP does not apply to New Jersey 
tax foreclosures voided as preferential does not conflict with 
binding precedent or out-of-Circuit caselaw.  Some courts 
within our Circuit have extended BFP to mortgage 
foreclosures under § 547(b)—but mortgage foreclosures 
entail different considerations from tax sale foreclosures, as 
the BFP Court emphasized.  For that reason, a case like In re 
Pulcini24 is distinguishable.  In Pulcini, the Western District 
of Pennsylvania Bankruptcy Court, finding no indication that 
§ 547(b) was intended to override Pennsylvania real property 
law, applied BFP to a sheriff’s sale and held that the sale was 
not avoidable.25  We find this holding unpersuasive as applied 
to New Jersey tax sales.26   
 
Decisions extending BFP to tax foreclosures under § 
548 are likewise distinguishable.  Not only does § 548 differ 
from § 547 in its requirements, but the circuit courts that have 
extended BFP to tax foreclosures under § 548 involved state 
                                              
24 261 B.R. 836 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001).   
25 261 B.R. at 844.   
26 We note that other district and bankruptcy courts have 
declined to extend BFP to mortgage foreclosures under § 
547(b).  E.g., In re Andrews, 262 B.R. 299 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
2001); Hampton v. Ontario County, 588 B.R. 671, 677 
(W.D.N.Y. 2018).   
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laws that subjected the property at issue to auction.27  The 
Tenth Circuit even noted in In re Grandote Country Club 
Company, Ltd. that “the decisive factor in determining 
whether a transfer pursuant to a tax sale constitutes 
‘reasonably equivalent value’ [under § 548] is a state’s 
procedure for tax sales, in particular, statutes requiring that 
tax sales take place publicly under a competitive bidding 
procedure.”28  Where the property was not subjected to public 
auction, courts have been less willing to extend BFP to tax 
foreclosures under § 548.29 
Finally, our decision today does not introduce a 
conflict with state law.  There is no explicit statutory 
                                              
27 In re Tracht Gut, LLC, 836 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(citing Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 3691(a)(1)(A)); In re 
Grandote Country Club Co., 252 F.3d 1146, 1152 (10th Cir. 
2001) (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-11-101, 39-11-108).  In 
re T.F. Stone Co., 72 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 1995), similarly 
involved Oklahoma law, which provides for competitive 
bidding.  See Okla. Stat. Ann. § 3129.  In any event, In re 
T.F. Stone Co. is also distinguishable as a § 549(c) case.  72 
F.3d at 470.   
28 252 F.3d at 1152.  
29 E.g., In re Smith, 811 F.3d 228, 238 (7th Cir. 2016) (as 
bidding at Illinois tax sales is limited to the penalty interest 
rate on the lien, not the value of the property, no correlation 
between the sale price and the value of the property and so 
BFP not applicable); In re GGI Props., LLC, 568 B.R. 231, 
247, 254-55 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017); In re Varquez, 502 B.R. 
186, 193 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2013); In re Berley Associates, Ltd., 
492 B.R. at 440.  A notable exception is In re McGrath, 170 
B.R. 78, 83 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994), which applied BFP to a tax 
foreclosure sale under § 548. 
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conflict—the New Jersey fraudulent conveyance statute,30 
which exempts tax foreclosures,31 does not address 
preferential transfers.  Arianna’s point that tax foreclosures 
generally cannot constitute voidable preferences under state 
law is also unavailing; the state preference statute requires an 
intent to prefer a certain creditor, unlike the Bankruptcy 
Code, so that comparing the two is unpersuasive.32  More 
importantly, since Congress has plenary power over 
bankruptcy, New Jersey state law is not germane to this 
case.33  And while a debtor’s filing for bankruptcy may 
impose a cloud on the title of her foreclosed property, we 
believe such a result to be mandated by the Code.34  
                                              
30 See N.J.S.A. § 25:2-20 et seq.  
31 See N.J.S.A. § 54:5-87.  
32 See N.J.S.A. § 2A:19-3.    
33 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8; see also Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 
U.S. 393, 397 (1992) (“‘What constitutes a transfer’ . . . is a 
matter of federal law.” (quoting McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 
323 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1945))).   
34 Arianna points out that so long as a debtor files for 
bankruptcy within the ninety-day preference period, she has 
another two years in which to file a claim voiding a transfer 
under § 547(b), resulting in a two year and ninety day cloud 
on title.  However, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of New Jersey in In re GGI Properties, LLC when 
analyzing § 548, “it is highly unlikely that everyone whose 
home is foreclosed due to tax liens will stampede the 
bankruptcy court just to avoid the transfer—bankruptcy is a 
long, intrusive and expensive process, and the consequences 
for abusing the system when one is not eligible for relief are 
serious ones.”  568 B.R. at 249 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
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In sum, Arianna’s first argument—that the Transfer 
cannot be voided as preferential—is precluded by the plain 
language of the statute and the differences between the 
mortgage foreclosure at issue in BFP and the tax sale 
foreclosure here.   
ii 
Arianna next argues that voiding the Transfer as 
preferential violates the Tax Injunction Act.  The Tax 
Injunction Act provides that “district courts shall not enjoin, 
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any 
tax under State law” if a remedy exists in state court.35  While 
the state has a “compelling interest”36 in enforcing the 
collection of taxes, Arianna’s argument is misguided.   
 
 Arianna faults the District Court for holding that 
voiding the Transfer “does not affect the Township of New 
Brunswick’s ability to still collect taxes.”37  The District 
Court relied in part on our 1995 decision in Simon v. Cebrick, 
which held that preventing a private citizen from foreclosing 
did “not affect the governmental entity’s ability to assess, 
levy, or collect any tax,” because “upon the sale of the tax 
certificate, the tax obligation is satisfied.”38  As Arianna 
points out, the New Jersey Supreme Court has since clarified 
that “a property owner’s tax delinquency survive[s] the sale 
of a tax certificate;” thus, “the certificate holder will hold a 
lien that is based on that delinquency.”39   
                                              
35 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 
36 Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 1999).  
37 In re Hackler, 588 B.R. at 401.   
38 53 F.3d 17, 22 (3d Cir. 1995). 
39 In re Princeton Office Park, 218 N.J. 52, 69 (2014). 
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We recognize that this guidance from the New Jersey 
Supreme Court undermines our reasoning in Simon.  But we 
need not decide whether Simon remains good law because 
“[i]t is well established . . . that the Tax Injunction Act does 
not prevent a Bankruptcy Court from enforcing the provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code that affect the collection of state 
taxes.”40  Arianna concedes that the specific powers of the 
Bankruptcy Code supersede the more general prohibitions of 
the Tax Injunction Act, but argues that no specific provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code permits courts to review and alter 
final judgments of tax foreclosure; thus, the Tax Injunction 
Act should govern.  But we need not frame the question so 
narrowly.  The Bankruptcy Code permits courts to unwind 
preferential transfers; that specific edict overrides the Tax 
Injunction Act.41   
                                              
40 In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., 335 F.3d 243, 247 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2003).   
41 See In re Ellett, 254 F.3d 1135, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (the 
Tax Injunction Act does “not abridge the power specifically 
granted to the bankruptcy court to make such judgments as 
may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Act.” (quoting Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. 
Goggin, 191 F.2d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 1951)); Hampton, 588 
B.R. at 677-78 (county’s interest in collecting property taxes 
must yield to Bankruptcy Code). 
18 
 
In sum, voiding the Transfer did not violate the Tax 
Injunction Act, and the District Court did not err in so 
holding.42       
III 
The Transfer meets all the plain language requirements 
of the preferential transfer statute and was properly voided.  
Because the policy concerns Arianna raises cannot overcome 
the Court’s duty to enforce the Bankruptcy Code, we will 
affirm. 
                                              
42 In briefing and at oral argument, Arianna argued that 
failing to apply BFP in this case could cause significant 
issues for municipalities that purchase tax liens at auction 
(often by default, when there is no other bidder).  That is, the 
Bankruptcy Court could, in the interest of preserving the 
stability of title or at the request of a delinquent taxpayer, 
simply direct the municipal lienholder to pay the value of the 
underlying transferred property rather than return the property 
itself.  See 11 U.S.C. § 550(a).  The municipality would then 
be stuck with a potentially large bill for which it had not 
budgeted.  Arianna suggests that Congress could not have 
contemplated § 547(b) to require this outcome, but in the 
absence of concrete evidence in the form of cases or 
legislative history, we will not speculate on such an 
eventuality.   
